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Post by BaalShemRa on Oct 8, 2004 8:52:31 GMT -5
So, I've been doing a reading course about John Stuart Mill's On Liberty and this is the result. Any ( *ANY* ) criticism ( grammar, pace, ideas I didn't put enough emphasis on, ideas I put too much emphasis on, structure of the text, your views on Mill, liberalism etc ) are welcome. I realise it's a long text, don,t feel obligated to read it until the end if you get bored.
Without further ado, here it is:
Today, of the three ideals of the French Revolution, liberty is the one that prevailed. One of the most influential shapers of our conception of liberty is John Stuart Mill and the essay in which he put the most eloquent defence of liberty he could muster is in the candidly titled On Liberty. The three main areas of concern in that essay are the liberty of thought and discussion ( free speech ), the importance of individuality to human well-being and the limits of the authority of society over the individual.
Of the liberty of thought and discussion
Had they been contemporaries, Mill and Voltaire would have had quite a correspondence. Not only did they have an equal amount of love for the Catholic Church but Mill very well could have been the one who came up with the famous: “I may not agree with what you say but I would die for your right to say it”. Free speech is defended by Mill in the second chapter of On Liberty, the longest and most fundamental one. Speech is less consequential, less complex and therefore less controversial than actions. Thus it makes sense to begin a defence of liberty with the former rather than the latter. He appears to be trying to get liberty’s foot in the door, knowing that once a chink has been made in the armour of authoritarianism, it will be difficult to stop it from spreading. He defends free speech by stating that we can’t really know an opinion to be false and that even if we did, it would still be wrong to censor it.
Fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves The presumption of infallibility does not refer to being convinced of an opinion but rather to deciding whether or not an opinion is true for others without allowing them to hear the other side. While an individual may be personally certain that an opinion is false, this does not mean he has absolute certainty that it’s false because no one has complete access to the unadulterated truth. To make the leap from personal certainty to absolute certainty is to presume of that which may not reasonably be presumed; one’s infallibility. Even though many will acknowledge their own fallibility in theory, that humility will seldom be carried over into the practical realm. This is evident in the fact that most do not seek safeguards against their fallibility and that they will not admit that an opinion they feel quite certain about might be an instance of their fallibility. When they do admit to their own fallibility, they tend to take the part of the world they have come into contract with as a source of ultimate authority, which is also problematic. After having addressed the leap that is made from personal certainty to absolute certainty, Mill attacks the habit of buttressing censorship on one’s group’s certainty.
Contingent lemmings Using one’s group, of whatever type, does not allow one to claim absolute certainty because it is a very contingent, even fickle standard. Using this standard, a person looking at his immediate surrounding or era would have a given belief but had he been born in a different place, time or community, he very well might have had a diametrically opposed belief. Thus, the justification for considering a doctrine the absolute truth would come down to: "I happen to have been born in an area/time where/when it was widespread". Mill reminds the reader that some ideas which used to be considered reprehensible are now considered acceptable and that others that used to be considered acceptable are now considered reprehensible. Mill then extrapolates that many an opinion that is now approved of will be disapproved of in the future. Mill has some fun with the example of Jesus of Nazareth who was killed, of all things, for blasphemy. The irony that relying on one’s surrounding group to determine truth and using coercion to silence dissent would have led a man of the Middle-Ages to persecute heretics in the name of Christianity just as he would have persecuted Christians had he been born in Antiquity is not lost on Mill. Hence, relying on what a group thinks at a given point in time or area is not rigorous enough to warrant absolute certainty.
The duty to suppress opponents That it is no more presumptuous to silence an opinion without absolute certainty than it is to act on an opinion without absolute certainty is a counter-argument Mill tackles at this point. The argument goes that humans should use their judgement and that its occasional misuse is not a reason to categorically deny its use. Waiting for perfection is a recipe for paralysis and loss. We must therefore use a standard which is lower than absolute certainty to act. Seen this way, not to silence dissent when one has certainty is not to avoid using illegitimate power but to shirk one’s responsibilities. Mill answers this counter-argument by stating that there is a world of difference between silencing attempts to refute an opinion because one is certain of it and being certain of an opinion because all attempts to refute it have been allowed and failed. Only the latter can give a fallible human cause for reasonable certainty and a justification to act on his opinion as regards others. Mill thus creates a catch-22 for the proponents of censorship in that even if one rejects the notion that falsehoods can be useful, the only people who could be justified in censoring others’ refutation attempts are those who know the whole truth and the only ones who can hope to know the whole truth are those who will allow all refutation attempts.
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Post by BaalShemRa on Oct 8, 2004 8:53:42 GMT -5
Conjectures and refutations The idea that it is the liberty to contradict an opinion that can justify the presumption that it’s true comes from Mill’s epistemological positions and his trust in progress. For him, no one comes down from the mountain bearing the truth, which is quite hard to find. It is only through unfettered discussion and rational argumentation that humanity can approach truth. For any controversial question, many will be in the wrong for any one person who’s in the right. Even that person, while being truly knowledgeable in one peculiar area, may hold grossly inaccurate and immoral beliefs in most other areas of knowledge. Since humanity has not always been at rock bottom in those areas, which is to say there’s been progress, humanity must have an inherent tendency to improve itself and be rational. Since the human mind is the fountain of all that is great in humans, that tendency must come from the mind. The cause of that tendency, according to Mill, is that the human mind’s errors are corrigible. ( p.90 ) By gaining experience and using discussion to interpret it, humanity can correct its mistakes. Facts and arguments can be presented to humans so that they may replace error with truth. To censor opinions stifles that process.
Partial truth Most of the time, the situation will not be as simple as the received opinion being false and the minority opinion being true. They will both contain some truth and some error. Through the collision of both opinions, the weak parts of the received opinion can yield to the strong parts of the minority opinion and vice versa, thus forming an opinion which is even closer to the truth. This is one way in which seeking the contradiction of one’s opinion strengthens it. The minority opinion may have its faults and be mixed with much error but one can hardly complain if an imperfect opinion improves one’s opinion which is also imperfect. Though Mill takes a few potshots at Rousseau throughout the book, it is this man he chooses as an example of a thinker who was more wrong than his modernist contemporaries but still contributed positively to the discourse of his day. He did so by mitigating exaggerations that were present in his opposition’s opinions, increasing their sophistication and making them less one-sided. In the long term, the few valuable ideas Rousseau had were more likely to be adopted than his less reasonable and more authoritarian ideas. Hence, even if one knew an opinion to be partially false, it is still possible for humanity to benefit from it. Complete falsehood The hardest case that can be made against censorship is when one knows the other opinion to be completely false and one’s opinion to be completely true. While Mill maintains that one cannot have absolute certainty that an opinion is false, he posits that even if we had that absolute certainty, it would still be wrong to suppress it. Even a complete truth needs to be freely discussed if it is to make humanity fully benefit from it. If a truth goes uncontested, its grounds will be forgotten, its essence will fade away and its impact might be greatly diminished. Knowing why an opinion is true and what it stands in contradistinction with makes the essence of that opinion far more vivid and is a better motivator than merely parroting an opinion because it’s the only seriously presented view that’s ever been on offer. A true opinion, to be as beneficial as it can be, needs a Devil’s advocate.
There is also the effect of encouraging a bad cognitive habit. An uncontested truth will come to resemble a prejudice, encouraging people to hold views in a prejudicial way. How one thinks is more important than what one thinks or, as Mill says: "Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think" ( p.102 ). Since it is rarely possible to suppress all discussion of the merits of an opinion, those who hold it without knowing its grounds are likely to be swayed away from it by whatever counter-argument is put forward, valid or not, simply because they have not been accustomed to hearing arguments against their opinion and do not know how to answer them. Furthermore, in matters where disagreement is likely, knowing the competing opinions and being able to refute them is necessary to rationally justify one’s preference for a given opinion. This requires the competing opinions to be freely defended if they are not to be straw men. If they are straw men, it would not justify belief in an opinion anymore than attacking a literal straw man would prove one to be a skilful warrior.
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Post by BaalShemRa on Oct 8, 2004 8:54:19 GMT -5
Throughout the book, Mill presents a patchwork of counter-arguments that favour censorship and then answers them.
Useful lies Useful lies are those that are supposed to be so useful to society that the government should protect it from criticism just as it protects any of society’s interests. Mill counters this argument by saying that the side in favour of censorship only shifts the question from the truth of an opinion to its utility and that this utility is itself a factual question which must be debated. To decide for all others that an opinion is deleterious is as illegitimate as deciding for all others that an opinion is false. The proponent of an opinion must be afforded the opportunity to defend the usefulness of his opinion just as he would its truthfulness. The author then blurs the line between utility and truth by stating that the truthfulness of an opinion is part of its utility. It cannot have escaped Mill that a useful lie can only be useful if the people who are supposed to be positively influenced by it consider it a truth. If it is openly discussed as a useful lie and referred to as such, whatever usefulness it might have had will be destroyed, taking away the justification for censorship in that instance. Thus, basing censorship on usefulness rather than truth wouldn’t solve more problems than it creates.
Truth must run the gauntlet Another argument goes that truth must pass through persecution and that, if it really is the truth, it will prevail because coercion is ineffective against truth. There are two counter-argument which Mill uses against this argument for censorship. The first one is that a proponent of such persecution cannot give much importance to the considerable benefits which bringers of new truths contribute to humanity and that this mode of thinking is reserved to "the sort of persons who think hat new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now." ( p.97 ) The second counter-argument is that it is not certain that truth will prevail when faced with persecution and if it does, it could take a very long time. Persecution which is constant and ruthless, not letting up on victims who do not have the wherewithal to defend themselves, will prove effective. The belief that legal and social punishment will be more effective in rooting out error than they are in rooting out truth is wishful thinking. The only advantage truth has over error is that it’s more likely to be rediscovered in a low censorship environment and gain strength to the point where it can’t be suppressed. Temperance and fairness The author then addresses the argument which proposes that any opinion may be expressed as long as its proponent remains temperate and fair. Being intemperate means using insults, sarcasm and the like while unfairness, in this case, would mean overlooking facts or counter-arguments, telling falsehoods or attacking a straw man. Mill attacks both of those criteria from a practical rather than a theoretical point of view. As relates to fairness in discussion, apparently dishonest tactics are commonly used in good faith. Separating the willingly unfair from the unwillingly unfair in a rigorous way is nearly unfeasible. As for intemperateness, it is easy for an opponent to be perceived as intemperate simply because he is both convinced and convincing. The rule prohibiting intemperateness is also far less often used against the intemperate attack on a minority opinion than it is against the intemperate attack on the prevailing opinion. To allow all content as long as it is presented fairly is a can of worms not worth opening and to allow it as long as it's temperate will only entrench the prevailing opinion.
The exception to the rule Mill does allow censorship when it prevents an incitement to harm others. While Mill doesn’t provide detailed criteria by which one could determine if this is the case, he does compare two concrete situations to give the reader an idea of what he means. The first example, which is allowable according to Mill, consists of circulating the idea that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor in the press. The second example, where Mill would be willing to use opprobrium and even coercion, differs in that the opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor is expressed in front of the house of a corn-dealer and the audience is composed of an agitated mob. Here, it is not the opinion that corn-dealers are bad people which is being acted against but the incitement to harm someone else. Inciting violence against other people would go against the main principle the book tries to justify; liberty, for liberty doesn’t mean being free to harm others.
It’s important to remember that Mill’s not saying that all opinions have equal validity, he’s saying that all individuals should have a negative right not to be silenced through force or opprobrium. Whether it’s done with the consent of the majority doesn’t matter, it’s still presuming of a certainty mere mortals don’t have and it’s harmful to the search for truth and truth itself if one is lucky enough to find it. Throughout the second chapter, one can see that Mill trusts in what would later be called the marketplace of ideas. This is strange because Mill has little esteem for the intellectual capabilities of the masses. How the collective mediocrity is supposed to be able to tell the difference between a knowledgeable wonk and a charismatic hack isn’t disclosed. This is another area where Mill would have agreed with Voltaire. They had an equal disdain for the intellectual faculties of the lower classes or the “vile multitude”. One possible explanation is that Mill thinks a top-down collective approach would be worse than one based on a plurality of individuals.
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Post by BaalShemRa on Oct 8, 2004 8:56:08 GMT -5
Of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being
The third chapter is mainly about the need for and advantages of individuality and the deleteriousness of Custom. The principles that were applied to opinions are now applied to acts and lifestyles with some crucial qualifiers. To Mill, following one’s individual nature and developing one’s highest faculties leads to the greatest well-being one can attain. The precise way in which this is to be accomplished can’t be defined because there is a multitude of natures and therefore a multitude of ways to reach the highest forms of pleasure. The opposite of this liberal attitude is that of Custom.
Individuality is central to human life. Individuality is composed of liberty and diversity. Mill defines liberty as the following principle: " […] men should be free to act upon their opinions – to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own risk and peril." ( p. 121 ) Liberty under that definition is the essential part of well-being. Here, physical hindrance refers to coercion and the power of the government generally whereas moral hindrance refers to such social pressures moral reprobation, becoming a pariah or being refused employment. Diversity refers to there being a wide variety of lifestyles present in society. Mill puts less emphasis on diversity than liberty, perhaps because if liberty is allowed, it goes without saying that diversity will follow. He is quite clear that there can be such as thing as too much liberty and not enough social control. In fact, barbaric societies are characterised by such a state of affairs. Despotism, which is any act that suppresses individuality, is legitimate when dealing with barbarians. However, Mill reckons that in his days the reverse is true; society has too much control over the individual.
Be all that you can be The importance given to individual liberty is largely based on his anthropological view. The view which Mill espouses is heavily influenced by the late 18th and early 19th century philosopher Wilhelm Von Humboldt who states that: "The end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole" ( p.122 ). This requires both liberty and diversity. By developing their faculties, another concept which continually comes up, humans become a "noble and beautiful object of contemplation"( p127 ), elevating their value as individuals and contributing more to society. In what looks like a radical departure from utilitarianism, Mill states that nothing is better than the actualisation of humans’ potential and nothing is worse than that which prevents it. Unless Mill thinks that actualising one’s potential and creating utility are 100% correlated, he cannot be said to be a utilitarian, that is, one who considers the utility maximisation as the ultimate normative criterion. For a writer as clear, keen and direct as Mill, it is surprising that he fails to clarify this point.
The evolutionary vanguard Mill realises that such arguments will leave those most opposed to liberty cold. He therefore attempts to show that if a man allows others to be free it can be beneficial to him. Much like freedom of discussion allows false opinions to be replaced by better adapted ones and true opinions do not become ossified when they are contested, the liberty to try new customs allows better adapted customs to be found while reminding normal people of why they take part in already existing good customs. In a claim which is reminiscent of Pareto’s principle of the vital few and the trivial many, Mill states that only a few individuals are capable of innovating well and that the merit of ordinary people, who form a “collective mediocrity” ( 130 ), remains largely in following the advice or example of this elite. These few diamonds amongst tons of coal are the engine of progress and it is crucial to create an environment that fosters extraordinary individuals. Such an environment is one where diversity is emphasised. Try before you buy Until the absolute best way of life has been found, diversity is crucial because it allows experiments that give us a posteriori information about the value of a given lifestyle. Since Mill is of those who believe that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, that information is quite precious. It might not even be possible to find the one and only best lifestyle because people come in all shapes and sizes and trying to squeeze them all into the same mould will be baneful to them for it may not take into account their particular shortcomings and strengths. Hence the need to be able to choose from a wide variety of lifestyles or construct one’s own lifestyle. People have different sources of pleasure and pain and some situations that will foster one’s self-development will hinder someone else’s. For those reasons, a lifestyle may be bad for nearly everyone while being the best there is for one individual if it the most suited to him. Conformity’s perniciousness resides in the fact that it does not allow the individual to find the lifestyle that most allows him to blossom.
The sum and its parts Not only will conformity limit the individual but it will also hurt society as a whole. Impulses being an intrinsic part of what it is to be human, they should be considered an opportunity rather than a pitfall and the stronger they are the greater the potential energy that can be tapped into. One can hardly wish for a moribund society. As long as impulses are matched by an equally strong conscience, impulses are more an asset than a liability because an individual’s own impulses are a far more effective motivator than the feeble passions of the group. The final lines of the book say it so well it is worthwhile that they be quoted at length: "a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes—will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish." ( p.175 ) Seeking to replace individuals’ impulses with society’s so as to benefit the latter is to be penny-wise and pound-foolish.
Compare, contrast, correct Another one of diversity’s advantages to collectivities is that contrasts between different entities allow all to learn from each other. This explains Europe’s greatness. The very different groups that compose Europe mutually learned from each other by looking at the results their different ways had lead to. That trend could be reversed, however, since Europe’s greatness doesn’t come from some sort of innate ( racial ) superiority over the other regions of the world. Mill considers that in his time, Europe is looking more and more like China, something he’s deathly afraid of because he thinks the whole East has "no history" ( p.135 ). Though the nations of the East have no history, they once had originality and progress, they were even the "greatest and most powerful nations of the world" ( p.135 ). They lost that status when they lost individuality, that pillar of progress. They are now but underlings to nations that have overtaken them and taken them over ( e.g.: the British ). In these parts of the world, what ended individuality was putting Custom above all else. The ability to impose the best wisdom available at a certain point in time to all people was not a blessing but a curse.
The poverty of traditionalism Custom, in the strong sense of the term, is doing what everybody does because that is what everybody does and not doing what everybody doesn’t do because that is what everybody doesn’t do. It’s eschewing the use of one’s intellectual faculties, which leads to their being weakened, and instead relying on what one’s group is in the habit of doing. Mill compares those who blindly follow Custom to apes in that, if all humans had to do was imitate what others have done before them, they would only need the simian ability to replicate that which they have observed others do. This wilfully insulting jab at traditionalists is reminiscent of his comparison of a Benthamite lifestyle to that of a pig. Mill seemed to prefer being remembered as trenchant to being remembered as courteous. The shock value, no doubt aimed at engraving the image of a traditionalist monkey in the minds of the readers, was justified to Mill because slavishly following Custom weakens individuals and is the major impediment to progress.
Two old nemeses Progress and Custom are antithetical and this to the point that the tug-of-war between the two is at the centre of history. The reason being that Custom crushes individuality by seeking to make all alike. This movement towards conformity reduces individuals’ liberty. Liberty is a necessary but not sufficient condition for progress. While all instances of liberty do not result in improvements, all improvements result from instances of liberty. With liberty, each individual is a potential source of progress because he can try to find something superior to what is customary in his time and others are free to adopt that new behaviour if they think it would fit them. With Custom, no one dares to rock the boat, preferring to stay in their mediocrity. To take away liberty is thus to kill progress in the bud. To a believer in progress as Mill is, this is one of the worst effects Custom could have. Following Custom is to doom oneself to stagnation at best and to a utility and dignity-decreasing atrophy at worst. To force one to adhere to Custom is as stifling to the search for progress as censorship is to the search for truth.
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Post by BaalShemRa on Oct 8, 2004 8:56:42 GMT -5
As Mill demonstrates, Custom, in the strong sense, stands in the way of both liberty and diversity, together forming individuality which is crucial if humans are to derive the greatest benefit they can from life. Custom, in the weak sense of the term, understood to mean the older generation passing down information about what it considers the best way to live to the younger generation, is not opposed by Mill. Indeed, it is one way in which he considers that society can legitimately assert itself. Even though Mill extols the virtues of freedom and individualism, he is not blind to the need for some social control over individual conduct.
Of the limits to the authority of society over the individual
In the last of the three main chapters, the Introductory and Applications chapters are more about putting the three central chapters into perspective than putting forward any novel ideas, Mill broadly delineates where society can or cannot go. To do this, he uses two principles: one for self-regarding actions and one for other-regarding actions. Both principles can be seen in to the whole essay but the fourth chapter centres around the dynamic between individuals and society.
Let it be The first overriding principle is that as long as no harm is done to others, mature individuals may serve their own interests as they see fit and no arm-twisting may be used to try to change their behaviour. This is much like the classic "your liberty stops where mine begins". One’s own actions that are without others’ liberty are referred to as "self-regarding". The definition of a mature individual is based on common sense and generosity. Other than the mentally-ill, children or groups and individuals who have repeatedly shown themselves to be irresponsible, one ought to be very sceptical before declaring that someone shall lose his liberty for treating someone like a child could turn him into one.
If you love it, set it free The main reason self-regarding acts ought not attract forceful interference, such as opprobrium or legal punishment, is that it will lead to less pain, more pleasure and a greater development of mental faculties if the people bearing the consequences are the ones making the decisions. Each individual has his interests at heart more than anyone else and he has the most accurate information about what gives him pain and pleasure as well as the details of his case. He is therefore the person who is most likely to make optimal decisions as far as he is concerned. Others might think that forcefully intervening will optimise the happiness/suffering ratio but they’re more likely to be wrong than right. As for those who simply don’t want some pleasures to be enjoyed, they should mind their own business. For that reason, when an individual is the only one to be mainly concerned by the consequences of an action or behaviour, others, even well-intentioned do-gooders, should not forcefully dictate what he can or cannot do. This stance against the forceful correction of what one considers others’ errors may seem selfish but that is far from the truth.
It’s for your own good Altruism, such as raising others’ consciousness or making them change their ways for what one reckons are better ways, is one of the highest virtues but Mill differs from many by thinking that it need not involve opprobrium or punishment as there are effective alternatives. The main means through which one may change the self-regarding behaviour of mature individuals is persuasion. Other acceptable means include judging the validity of others’ actions, avoiding people and advising others to do the same, though not to the point of a smear campaign. After having been subjected to the above, that is, the natural reactions of other people to one’s behaviour, the final decision on what should be done rests with the mature individual performing the self-regarding action and no one else. In cases where, because of a given constraint, the liabilities of an action are impossible to explain to the individual, one may force him not to perform that action because that is not acting against his informed will. While it’s illegitimate to force one’s judgements on mature adults’ self-regarding actions, children are to be treated differently.
Only the educated are free Liberty requires responsibility. Children do not have the latter and so are not entitled to the former. Since society enjoys much control over children, it’s preferable to raise them into rational adults rather than to continually correct their behaviour once they’re grownups. It is not only the privilege of the adult generation to pass down its accumulated wisdom to the younger one but also its duty so that the next generation may equal and even surpass the present one or at least be able to take a long term view of its interests. That society has control over its children doesn’t mean that coercion may be used lightly. Doing so could backfire through rebellion and a discrediting of better means to instil customs. Once the individual has reached adulthood, he is free to behave as he wishes when it comes to self-regarding acts. However, all acts are not self-regarding. *Here, one can see a positive definition of freedom. Freedom isn’t only being free to do whatever one wishes. A child has a positive right to an education that will bring him up to a sufficient level of civilisation that will allow him to flourish and freedom worthwhile.
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Post by BaalShemRa on Oct 8, 2004 8:56:55 GMT -5
Come together The second overriding principle is that if one’s actions harm others, society may use opprobrium or coercion to protect itself. Mill is less keen to use coercion than opprobrium, reserving it for the most severe of faults to others. Opprobrium may be used for other-regarding acts that don’t quite violate what should be considered basic rights. Mill doesn’t try to make an exhaustive list of those rights. The opposition that is present against forcefully modifying self-regarding behaviour is absent when it comes to other-regarding behaviour because the perpetrator can no longer claim it’s private business and since each individual only has to judge the effects on his own interests, society’s judgement is likely to be accurate. All that mainly affects the legitimate interests of people who have not given their uncoerced and undeceived consent to an act falls under the jurisdiction of society. Breaches of contract, deception, coercion, selfish non-intervention and even the dispositions which lead to those evils are examples of what ought to be considered society’s business.
There are some exceptions to this rule. There may be times when the legitimate interests of different people are irreconcilable. This is chiefly the fault of defective institutions and is best addressed at the macro level. That is, by changing the structures of the society. Furthermore, some actions that harm others but are advantageous to society in the aggregate, such as honest economic competition, may be tolerated. Intervention can even be acceptable to stop the strongest individuals from taking advantage of the weakest ones even if fraud and force aren’t used, which isn’t in line with the laissez-faire economics one would expect Mill to espouse. Some take the principle that harmful acts to others must be punished to an extreme where all must sacrifice themselves for the greater good like an ant would for its colony.
Force marching towards utopia That no man is an island is a truism but it doesn’t follow that one must always act perfectly in all cases that remotely affect others. If it were so, legitimate freedom would consist of nothing more than having secret thoughts. A self-regarding action must therefore be defined as one that allows as much self-preferential liberty to oneself as one would allow to others. For example, a Christian has the right to be a Christian but he does not have the right to force his Muslim neighbour to be a Christian, even if his religion tells him he must do that. If he did, his Muslim neighbour would have the right to force him to be a Muslim too. The way in which both men’s liberty can avoid being oppressive to others is if they both have the freedom to choose their own religion but not their neighbour’s. Furthermore, if an act causes psychological pain simply someone else perceives it to be wrong, that can be suffered in the name of liberty. *( One could add that the solution lies in the offended party ceasing to believe it’s wrong. Forbidding an act because causes pain because one perceives it to be wrong comes down to saying: “It’s wrong because it’s wrong because it’s wrong”. ) The closest Mill gets to a collectivist view is when he allows Sabbatarian legislation and he does so only because he thinks it’s impossible for many to gain a great benefit without forcing others to jump in as well. * ( what would today be called a Nash equilibrium )
Paying your dues When it comes to one’s contribution to society, once an individual has fulfilled his obligations to others, he may perform whatever self-regarding actions he desires for his time and money are his own. To force him to contribute to society beyond a "distinct and assignable obligation to any other person" ( p.144 ) is to turn him into a slave. Helping to protect society in return for receiving society’s protection is one such legitimate obligation. A person also has an obligation to fulfil explicit contracts he’s freely entered into and implicit duties such as taking care of his family. An example Mill gives is illuminating. If a normal person gets drunk he is not to be punished but a drunk soldier on duty should be punished. This is not because alcohol itself is an evil but because the soldier made himself unable to perform his clear duty. Had the soldier been sleeping while on duty, it would have been just as reprehensible and few would call sleep itself a great evil.. All society is allowed to expect from an individual is that he fulfil certain ends-based objectives that are a consequence of his choices and prerogatives. Mill doesn’t think the idea of a social contract really helps and sees society first and foremost as a collection of individuals. An important but less central function of government than protecting individuals’ liberty is preventing harm to others.
The biggest risk is not taking any Preventing harm is often more efficient than punishing it but it is also more open to abuse. Preventing any activity simply because it might result in harm to others would lead to paralysis since almost everything one does could be argued to put others at risk. Mill therefore tries to enunciate guidelines for prevention. If an economic or social activity presents a risk of harm to others, regulation to effectively detect, diminish and deter harm to others is acceptable. However, it is not permissible to enact regulations or taxes so burdensome that there is a de facto prohibition of an activity. Regulation must have for sole purpose to reduce harm to others, never to prevent an activity from taking place. For its part, taxation will have to happen and if government is to function, so it might as well be by discouraging what is seen as an evil.
On the other hand. an entity ( be it an individual, a business or a society ) that has shown it will systematically harm others if it performs a given activity may be prevented from performing that activity. For example, drinking is to be allowed but a man with a history of violence when drunk may be prevented from drinking. People must be given the benefit of the doubt. If they prove unworthy of it, the relevant part of their liberty may be taken away from them. The theme of the atrophy of faculties is again present in that if people are treated like children they very well might become puerile. Before undertaking paternalistic policies, the government must first give the benefit of the doubt to the population. Getting burned a few times because of excessively bonhomous naivete isn’t as bad as the infantilisation of populations with potential because of excessive suspiciousness.
As we have seen, self-regarding acts are best not meddled with except through discussion and education if one both wishes for individuals to be happy and is realistic about the effectiveness of intervention and the frequency of unintended consequences. Other-regarding acts can warrant intervention from the wider society but one ought to err on the side of freedom and individuality when in doubt rather than on that of safety and society. To limit the potential for abuse, fuzzy and expansive definitions of individual requirements towards society ought to be eschewed in favour of requirements that are as important as they need to be but no more.
In short, truth requires free speech, happiness requires free acts and society should be geared towards protecting liberty while encroaching as little as possible on said liberty in the process. Striving for the Perfect through authoritarian means is the enemy of the individualistic liberal Good. Though On Liberty isn’t an attempt to give Britain a constitution, which can leave it wanting in some definitional areas, but is rather meant as a spark that will foster discussion of liberty in greater details, it still contains much wisdom. Perhaps the most important lesson concerns intervention and is that, to mix highbrow and lowbrow culture, the road to serfdom is paved in gold.
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